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Cognitive mapping involves the description of the way individuals store and process geographic information. Typically,
cognitive mapping data are derived from individual responses and then analyzed in one of three ways: (1) the individual
data sets are analyzed separately and only pooled for comparison (disaggregation); (2) the individual data sets are
averaged and then analyzed (collective aggregation); or (3) the individual data sets are analyzed and the results averaged
(individual aggregation). This paper compares the latter two aggregation strategies for analyzing cognitive mapping
data using data collected in a large-scale study of students’ configurational knowledge of the city of Swansea in the
United Kingdom. It is contended that the aggregation strategy adopted will have a fundamental effect upon the
conclusions drawn from a study. Key Words: aggregation, cognitive mapping, ecological fallacy.
Introduction
We have implicitly directed attention to theaggregation problem. On what basis does
the behavioral geographer validly aggregate? It is
not too strong to say we know virtually nothing
about how aggregation . . . affects the results of a
study. And how can we examine this question until
we can identify behavioral characteristics and em-
pirically and theoretically test the consequences of
different aggregation schemes? Surely this is the
most pressing problem of behavioral researchers.
(Golledge and Stimson 1987, 313)
The need to know about the world around us is
fundamental to our daily lives. Each of us gath-
ers and processes information to be used in
decisions and choices regarding our spatial be-
havior. To make sense of the information gath-
ered, it is hypothesized that we organize in our
minds an understanding of the world in which
we  live  (Kitchin 1994a). Cognitive mapping
concerns the study of how we consciously, and
more commonly subconsciously, acquire, learn,
develop, think about, and store data relating to
our everyday geographic environment (Downs
and Stea 1973a). In recent years, a wide diversity
of techniques has been used to gain an under-
standing of the way an individual comprehends
part of the world. These techniques can be di-
vided into those that gather data relating to
distance and direction and those that produce
some sort of a cartographic representation
(Kitchin and Jacobson, forthcoming). Examples
of the latter could include asking individuals to
locate certain places on a map, to draw a route
between two places, or to draw a map of a city
showing the major landmarks. Whatever the
task, the result is a set of individual cognitive
data that needs to be summarized in some way
in order to make some general statements about
spatial cognition. There are three primary ways
of producing such generalizations, as shown in
Figure 1.
The first of these is disaggregation, where the
data for each individual are analyzed separately
and the results are pooled only for comparison
(Fig. 1a). As a result, individual cases are still
identified and differences between individuals
can be noted. The second strategy, collective ag-
gregation, requires the data to be aggregated
prior to analysis so that only a single analysis
takes place on the aggregated data (Fig. 1b). The
results from the pooled data are taken to repre-
sent the whole group and there is no possibility
of observing individual-level results. In the third
strategy, that of individual aggregation, the data
are analyzed at the individual level but the results
are both pooled and averaged and either the
mean or median values are taken to represent
the members of the whole group (Fig. 1c).
Because the aggregation strategies are differ-
ent, it is likely that the results from them will
differ, leading to weak internal validity (the pos-
sibility of drawing alternative conclusions from
the same data). As such, depending on the ag-
gregation strategy used, fundamentally different
conclusions could be drawn from the same data
set, leading the researcher(s) to either under- or
Professional Geographer, 49(3) 1997, pages 269–280 © Copyright 1997 by Association of American Geographers.
Initial submission, August 1995; revised submissions, March 1996, October 1996, November 1996; final acceptance, November 1996.
Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK.
ARTICLES
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
ati
on
al 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
 Ir
ela
nd
, M
ay
no
oth
] a
t 0
5:5
1 0
8 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
4 
Individual
data sets
Individual
results
Analysis
rank
Individual
data sets
Individual
results
Analysis
Individual
data sets
Data
averaged
Pool
results
a. Disaggregation
b. Collective aggregation
c. Individual aggregation
Pool
data
Analysis
Group
result
Group
results
Pool
results
Results
averaged
Group
result
Group
data set
r2
r2
r2
r2
r2
r2
r2
r2
r2
r2
r2
r2
r2
Figure 1: Strategies of analysis.
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overestimate the cognitive map knowledge of a
group of individuals. The effect has been noted
by Ewing (1981), but there has been no large-
scale examination of this issue. This paper com-
pares the results of aggregating individual
cognitive mapping data using both aggregation
strategies described above, critically appraising
their usefulness in analyzing cognitive mapping
data sets.
Aggregation Strategies for Cognitive
Mapping Data
While it has long been recognized that the
results of any spatial analysis using aggregate-
level data will be sensitive to the definition of
the areal units for which the data are reported
(Gehlke and Biehl 1934; Neprash 1934), there
has been a recent resurgence of interest in this
topic (Openshaw 1983; Fotheringham and
Wong 1991; and Fotheringham et al. 1995).
These studies examine the sensitivity of ana-
lytical results to modifications in the way areal
units are defined and typically show that dif-
ferent conclusions can be drawn from the
same data when they are aggregated either to
different levels (a scale effect) or in different
zones at the same scale (the zoning effect).
This paper has a different emphasis in that it
examines the sensitivity of cognitive mapping
results to the method of aggregation. In this
paper we examine two different ways in which
individual responses might be aggregated, de-
fined in Figures 1b and 1c, in order to identify
generalities regarding spatial cognition.
There is evidence to suggest that the issue of
aggregation is especially important in cognitive
studies. Bryant (1984, 43), for example, con-
cluded that there is “little evidence . . . to sug-
gest . . . a unified mental representation of the
geographical environment,” suggesting that al-
though individuals may experience the same
social and physical characteristics, large differ-
ences in cognitive map knowledge still exist be-
tween respondents. Aggregation, therefore, is
likely to mask the true cognitive map knowledge
of individuals. Thus, Lloyd (1989, 123) suggests
that “averaging coordinate data for individual
subjects to determine the characteristics of typi-
cal individual cognitive maps may not accurately
represent either the severity or character of dis-
tortions in such  maps.”  Harman and Betak
(1976) argued that this is because the evidence
that groups share the same socioeconomic,
ethnic, or familiarity characteristics is circum-
stantial and does not mean that groups share
the same cognitive structures. They further
argued (Harman and Betak 1976, 14) that “there
is a real need to reexamine . . . the extent to
which it is meaningful to aggregate across
individual differences.”
Alternatively, Gould (1975) argued that in-
dividual responses are not particularly mean-
ingful except at a highly personal level, and it
is only through aggregation that distinct, in-
terpretable patterns emerge. He supple-
mented this (Gould 1976) by arguing that an
understanding of the individual’s spatial be-
havior does not give a comprehensive under-
standing of how a group of individuals act as
a system, when we so obviously share the same
spatial behavior patterns. Downs and Stea
(1973b) contended that individuals within a
group can be aggregated because the spatial
environment experienced contains many regu-
lar and recurrent features with spatial behavior
patterns of individuals displaying similar origins,
destinations, and frequency of movement. Ad-
ditionally, they argued that people share com-
mon information, processing capabilities, and
strategies. These capabilities are associated
with innate, physiological parameters of hu-
man information processing, while the com-
mon strategies are learned methods of coping
with the environment. Thus people experi-
ence the environment in similar ways, using
common experiential  models of geographic
space.
To date, most cognitive mapping data have
been analyzed using the collective aggregation
strategy (Magana et al. 1981; Golledge et al.
1985; Lloyd 1989). Little use has been made of
the individual aggregation method, although
this is not surprising given that both analytical
behavioral geography and environmental psy-
chology are “positivistic” in nature. Certainly,
until recent developments in computing power
it would have been unrealistic to analyze the data
at an individual scale  due  to logistical  con-
straints. However, it is now possible to quickly
and efficiently analyze large numbers of individ-
ual data sets. It is therefore the intention of this
study to determine whether there are likely to
be sufficient differences in the conclusions
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drawn from these two aggregation strategies and
to comment critically on their respective advan-
tages and disadvantages.
The Experimental Data
The data used were collected as part of a larger
study  assessing  170  students’ configurational
knowledge of the Swansea region in the United
Kingdom. In this larger study, students were
divided into 6 groups who each completed 4
tests from a total of 13 tests. In all, 52 students
were asked to locate 25 places in the region using
two different spatial cued response (SCR) tests
(Fig. 2). In the first (SCR1), 19 students were
given only the locations of the Geography De-
partment at the University of Wales Swansea
and the bus station to guide their placements. In
the second (SCR2), 33 students were also given
the coastline to guide their responses. Given
that respondents were matched for educational
ability and familiarity (all had been resident in
Swansea for 9-10 weeks), one might expect the
responses to be more accurate in the second test
where more spatial information was provided.
To  fully  explore any potential aggregation
effects caused by the aggregation strategy used,
the two sets of experimental data (SCR1 and
SCR2) were analyzed at four different levels.
The resulting sub-data sets are differentiated in
terms of the number of locations they contain
(Table 1). The  data sets are progressively
ordered with data of increasing familiarity re-
moved at each level. Data set A contains data on
the cognitive locations of all 25 places. In data
set B, the locations of all places reported as
“guessed” by the respondents were eliminated.
In data set C, those places that scored a familiar
rating less than 2 (unknown or low familiarity
places) were excluded; and in data set D, those
places scoring a familiar rating less than 4 (un-
known, low,  and medium familiarity  places)
were excluded to leave those places which were
very familiar. All the data sets were analyzed
using bidimensional regression, which is essen-
tially ordinary least squares regression extended
to two dimensions (Tobler 1965), with cognized
locations bidimensionally  regressed into real
world locations. This was performed using the
CMAP package (Kitchin 1994b).
Figure 2: The tests used to investigate aggregation.
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Results
Tables 2 and 3 provide the aggregated values for
all the bidimensional regression results for each
of the four data sets (A-D) for the two spatial
cued response tests. The result variables in the
tables represent different facets of the goodness-
of-fit between the real world and cognitive data
sets. The r2 value represents the measure of
association  between the  two configurations.
The scale is an index that measures the scale
change needed to produce the best fit between
the cognitive space and the real world space. A
scale value of less than one indicates that the
cognitive space needs to be contracted (reduced)
to fit the real world space; a scale value of greater
than one indicates that the cognitive space needs
to be expanded. The angle value is the angle to
which the coordinate axes must be rotated to
produce the best fit with the real world space.
An angle value with a positive value indicates the
counterclockwise rotation needed to produce a
best fit; a negative value indicates the clockwise
rotation. The a1 value is the horizontal transla-
tion, with a positive value indicating a west-to-
east shift and a negative value indicating an
east-to-west shift; a2 is the vertical translation,
with a positive value indicating a south-to-north
shift and a negative value indicating a north-to-
south shift (Lloyd 1989). The distortion index
Table 1 Experimental Data Sets
Data set SCR 1 (No Coastline) Data set SCR 2
(No Coastline) (Coastline)
Sub-data set A 25 places located 25 places located
Sub-data set B Guesses removed Guesses removed
Sub-data set C Low familiar places removed Low familiar places removed
Sub-data set D Low and medium places removed Low and medium places removed
Table 2 Spatial Cued Response Test 1 Aggregated Results for Four Data Sets
Variable Data set A Data set B
CA IA CA IA
mean mean med st d mean mean med st d
r2 .77 .55 .59 .18 .82 .67 .72 .13
scale 0.96 0.81 0.83 0.16 0.95 0.82 0.82 0.16
angle -24.21 -25.65 -26.42 8.93 -22.17 -23.56 -24.79 8.92
a1 285.56 351.2 363.7 107.9 272.39 327.8 309.8 106.9
a2 -194.99 -99.5 -118.4 130.1 -174.26 -104.1 -75.7 132.5
distortion index 35.30 50.42 48.20 12.29 30.51 42.20 38.88 9.89
box side 1 225.27 375.5 373.8 122.5 232.54 299.5 270.8 96.6
box side 2 397.24 508.3 513.8 159.1 318.94 332.3 330.1 147.3
absolute distortion 2382 2929 2878 1003 2314 2317 2200 1065
relative distortion 1721 2436 2544 685 1527 1646 1747 625
total distortion 2676 3643 3481 1072 2535 2704 2741 1169
Variable Data set C Data set D
CA IA CA IA
mean mean med st d mean mean med st d
r2 .85 .69 .72 .16 .80 72 .72 .16
scale 0.94 0.82 0.80 0.14 0.88 0.84 0.82 0.18
angle -22.86 -22.00 -17.39 10.79 -19.98 -17.64 -19.30 14.74
a1 276.20 317.8 316.8 111.3 270.59 262.2 280.9 160.9
a2 -189.65 -99.3 -60.4 135.3 -136.35 -75.7 -60 161.2
distortion index 28.22 39.79 38.98 12.30 32.06 37.53 38.89 12.41
box side 1 233.08 232.5 221.2 99.4 275.73 175.1 145.5 85.7
box side 2 281.07 226.4 191.0 128.5 250.45 150.4 106.6 89.6
absolute distortion 2393 1569 1385 951 2067 968 1102 528
relative distortion 1513 1099 975 593 1464 687 797 352
total distortion 2546 1780 1482 1010 2318 1062 1171 519
CA - data aggregated
IA - individual aggregated
med - median
st d - standard deviation
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provides a measure of how distorted the cogni-
tive configuration is on a scale between 0 and
100 and is the ratio of D to Dmax, where D is the
average distance of vectors separating matched
pairs and Dmax is the maximum value D can
achieve, which is constrained by the objective
map size (Waterman and Gordon 1984). This
can be displayed graphically using a box of dis-
tortion that indicates the orientation of maxi-
mum and minimum distortion for each point
whether by stretching or compressing, and the
box’s diagonal is the distortion distance D. The
absolute distortion refers to the distance be-
tween the real and cognitive locations and the
relative distortion indicates whether the loca-
tions in the cognitive configuration are posi-
tioned relative to each other. The total
distortion  combines both  of these elements.
Each of these bidimensional regression variables
reveals a different facet about the association
between the cognitive space and real world space
and allows the exact reason for any differences
between spaces to be determined. For example,
r2 values for two different individual data sets
might be very similar, but the two data sets
might differ significantly in terms of the scaling
(scale), rotation (angle), and translation (a1 and
a2) needed to produce the best fit. Similarly,
while some variables such as scale and angle
might be contiguous, patterns of distortion
might differ substantially across cognitive space.
It is therefore important to examine all of these
variables in order to fully understand individual
and collective cognitive spaces and their rela-
tionship to real world space.
The four major columns of data refer to the
four data sets used in which differences between
cognized and actual locations are analyzed for
different numbers of places. For each data set,
results are reported for both the collective ag-
gregation scheme and the individual aggrega-
tion scheme. For the latter, where individual
results are averaged, both the mean and median
results for all respondents completing each re-
spective test are reported. The standard devia-
tion across the respondents is also reported. In
Table 3 Spatial Cued Response Test 2 Aggregated Results for Four Data Sets
Variable Data set A Data set B
CA IA CA IA
mean mean med st d mean mean med st d
r2 .79 .52 .59 .25 .85 .67 .75 .22
scale 1.17 0.87 0.94 0.87 1.12 0.91 0.94 0.14
angle -5.32 -5.11 -4.36 -5.11 -5.31 -5.75 -4.08 10.75
a1 -47.81 114.24 91.20 114.24 -29.71 91.9 56.4 127.0
a2 -122.04 24.40 22.42 24.40 -105.96 -9.9 -7.2 82.1
distortion index 33.56 52.18 48.33 52.18 27.78 41.60 36.32 16.06
box side 1 169.44 408.46 403.50 408.46 128.37 296.6 251.3 128.7
box side 2 399.74 517.01 509.86 517.01 335.80 328.9 343.2 151.7
absolute distortion 1007.43 1370.5 1321.2 1370 836.24 966 784 665
relative distortion 1579.71 2384 264.4 2384 1340 1562 1456 578
total distortion 1455.36 2431.8 2390.6 2431 1215 1652 1422 681
Variable Data set C Data set D
CA IA CA IA
mean mean med st d mean mean med st d
r2 .89 .78 .84 .19 .93 .79 .86 .20
scale 1.06 0.93 0.96 0.11 1.00 0.93 0.92 0.16
angle -4.31 -2.34 -1.13 7.07 -5.00 -2.49 -0.45 7.36
a1 4.81 65.6 51.4 83.5 43.55 69.3 72 100.3
a2 -73.68 4.5 3.6 86.3 -62.01 -4.5 10.3 109.2
distortion index 23.29 32.59 28.57 14.89 18.71 30.45 27.44 15.97
box side 1 95.13 182.5 157.1 92.9 118.58 131.8 129.7 89.5
box side 2 285.98 200.3 159.3 138.9 221.15 122 104 73.8
absolute distortion 576 .98 583 453 585 513.78 468 341 568
relative distortion 1150 845.6 806.2 459.9 920.34 523.4 494.5 379.3
total distortion 1046 923.7 822.6 555 958.16 622 487 532
CA - data aggregated
IA - individual aggregated
med - median
st d - standard deviation
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all cases the most obvious comparison to make
is between the CA (collective aggregation) score
and the mean IA (individual aggregation) score,
although the median and standard deviation fig-
ures for the IA method are also informative
because they show the degree of deviation in
individual estimates.
It is clear that the two aggregation strategies
produce different results for all four sub-data
sets on both spatial cued response tests (Fig. 3).
For example, the collective aggregation r-
squared value for data set A for SCR1 (Table 2)
is .77. The equivalent individual aggregate value
is .55 with a standard deviation of .18. A similar
difference  is observed in Table 2  for SCR2.
Indeed, Figure 4 shows that in both tests the vast
majority of the individual r-squared values are
lower than the respective aggregate CA values.
In both tests, but particularly in SCR2 where the
coastline was provided, the aggregated values
disguise a great deal of variation in the individual
responses, with some individuals clearly having
an accurate cognition of the environment and
others having very poor mental representations
of the area.
A comparison of the r-squared values across
the four sub-data sets (A-D) reveals that the
difference between the two aggregation strate-
gies tends to decrease as the more unfamiliar
locations are excluded from each individual’s
responses (Fig. 3). For instance, in data set D for
SCR1, the r-squared value for the CA frame-
work is .80 compared with a value of .72 with a
standard deviation of .16 for the IA framework.
As expected, the r-squared values tend to in-
crease as the more unfamiliar places are dropped
from the analysis, and comparing equivalent
values and the cognitive maps appears to be
more accurate when more spatial cueing is pro-
vided (Fig. 3). However, this result is itself a
product of aggregation, as the individual results
shown in Figure 4 suggest. It would appear from
the individual r-squared values for SCR2, where
more spatial information is provided in the form
of the local coastline, that this extra information
has the effect of producing a much greater vari-
ation in the accuracy of the cognitive maps.
However, the extra spatial information is not
leading to more accurate aggregated results as
might be expected. The reason for this is that
respondents are being asked to locate 25 places
regardless of whether they are familiar with each
place. Once the guesses (data set B) and unfamil-
iar places (data sets C and D) have been removed
from the analysis the effect of the spatial cueing
becomes apparent, with large increases in indi-
vidual r-squared values and associated rises in IA
and CA aggregated r-squared values (Figs. 3 and
4; Tables 2 and 3).
There are similar differences between the CA
and IA methods of analysis on all the reported
statistics in Tables 1 and 2. In most cases the
results suggest that the interpretations regard-
ing cognitive process would differ according to
which method was employed. For example, the
CA scale values are higher than the IA scale
values. The IA scale values indicate that on
average, the cognitive space of individual maps
needs to be enlarged to best fit the real world
space. The process of collective aggregation has
removed this scaling effect. The differences be-
tween CA and IA values are consistent across the
bidimensional regression variables, with no one
variable being affected more than the others.
However, the differences between the CA and
IA angle values are negible. This is because for
both SCR1 and SCR2 the coastline acts as a
strong frame of reference by which to orientate
placements. For SCR2 the coastline was pro-
vided to the respondents. On SCR1, the coast-
line was the dominant, mental, frame of
reference. Students generally believed that the
coastline was “shallower” than in reality, and as
a consequence, orientated all their placements
to fit this notion. There is little deviation be-
tween CA and IA values because of the consis-
tency of this miscognition, with the majority of
respondents believing the bay to be orientated
along an east-west orientation.
Generally, the CA method produces a more
stable set of results as the more unfamiliar
places are excluded from the data set, with the
IA method showing more clearly the improve-
ment in individuals’ cognitive maps as more
unfamiliar places are excluded from the analy-
sis. For instance, the total distortion measure
reported for both SCR1 in Table 1 and SCR2
in Table 2 exhibits very little change across the
four data sets when it is computed by the CA
method but shows a rather dramatic change
when computed by the IA method (the value
for data set D being less than a third that for
data set A in both cases) (Fig. 3). Again, this
suggests that the more usual method of analy-
sis, the CA method, which involves aggregat-
ing the  data prior to analysis, can disguise
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Figure 3: Comparing selected bidimensional regression results across sub-data sets.
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some interesting facets of cognitive mapping
that are apparent only in the IA results by re-
moving individual idiosyncratic differences.
However, although the above results suggest
that the collective aggregation strategy needs to
be used with caution when examining cognition,
the strategy does allow groups of individuals to
be compared on the basis of their shared place
cognition.  Place cognition is  the  consensual
view of where each individual place is located.
Through collective aggregation, a group’s un-
derlying, shared cognitive map knowledge can
be investigated, with the unique individual de-
viations removed. It is argued that any remain-
ing systematic distortions will be part of normal
processing and part of a group’s cognitive map
Figure 4: R-squared values from the spatial cured response tests.
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knowledge (Lloyd and Heivly 1987). Thus the
method allows the group’s cognition of the base
data to be assessed, although there may well be
problems of making inferences about the group’s
individual cognition. A similar finding in differ-
ent contexts has been reported by, inter alia,
Newcombe (1985), Cadwallader (1976), Mackay
and Olshavsky (1975), and Lloyd (1989).
Significance of Differences
The  fact  that  the  two different aggregation
strategies produced differing results and hence
alternative conclusions when used to analyze the
same data sets has important implications relat-
ing to validity and integrity of a study. In par-
ticular, analytical and ecological validity become
weakened. Analytical validity concerns whether
the most appropriate method of analysis has
been chosen, leading to results that are concep-
tually or statistically sound and represent the
data truly (Turk 1990). For example, McNamara
et al. (1989) suggest that some methods of analy-
sis might impose a structure on the results that
in reality does not exist. The example they use
to highlight this problem is that of an ordered
tree algorithm used to determine if data are
hierarchically structured. This approach, they
argue, might identify a hierarchical structure in
the data, where in fact only clustering across an
area takes place. Thus in some cases this analysis
leads to erroneous conclusions because the re-
sults cannot be interpreted with confidence.
Ecological validity is concerned with the in-
ferences that can be made from the results of a
study. In psychology, it generally refers to the
extent to which environments experienced by
the respondents in a scientific investigation have
the properties they are supposed to have, or are
assumed to have by the investigator (Brofen-
brenner 1979). In geography, however, ecologi-
cal validity generally concerns the problems of
inferring characteristics of individuals from ag-
gregate data referring to a population (Johnston
et al. 1991). There are a number of other fallacies
associated with ecological validity concerning
the problems of generalization across circum-
stances, times, and areas (Alker 1969). Individu-
alistic fallacy is the assumption that a whole is no
more than the sum of its parts; many societies
are more than mere aggregations of individuals
and the characteristics of the latter should not
necessarily be attributed to the former. Univer-
sal (external) fallacy assumes that the pattern
observed in a sample holds for all, but very
often, the data set studied is not a random
sample of the population to which the results
are generalized. Selective fallacy occurs when
the experimenter uses carefully selected cases
to “prove” a general point. Cross-sectional
fallacy is the assumption that what is observed
at one point in time holds for others. Cross-
level fallacy assumes that a pattern observed
for one aggregation of the data will hold for
all aggregation (using the same strategy) with
differences in scale and zonation potentially
affecting results (modifiable areal unit prob-
lem [MAUP]).
This study has amply demonstrated that there
also exists an analytical fallacy, which assumes
that the pattern observed for one aggregation of
the data will hold when a different aggregation
strategy is used. This is clearly not the case. As
such, we have shown that, at present, both the
analytical and ecological validity of cognitive
mapping studies using an aggregation strategy
are weakened. However, by identifying  the
strengths and weaknesses of each strategy it has
been demonstrated that each strategy can be
used with confidence to explore particular
trends within the data. As a result, it is suggested
that care needs to taken to choose the appropri-
ate aggregation strategy when analyzing cogni-
tive mapping data sets. Blindly adopting the
traditional collective aggregation strategy could
potentially lead to weakened validities and to a
study with low integrity, from which few defini-
tive conclusions can be drawn.
Conclusions
Clearly,  care has to be exercised in drawing
conclusions from aggregated cognitive mapping
data. The strategy of collective aggregation is
useful for measuring place cognition, but no
inferences concerning the cognitive maps of in-
dividuals (individual cognition) can be drawn
from such a strategy of analysis because it exag-
gerates individual cognition by removing resid-
ual errors. As such, cognitive mapping studies
that have employed the strategy of collective
aggregation to draw conclusions about individu-
als’ cognitive maps might be misleading. For
instance, Magana et al. (1981) used the strategy
of collective aggregation individual coordinate
data to compare four different tests designed to
measure configurational knowledge. As noted,
such a strategy is flawed because collective
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aggregation removes residual error producing r2
values that are similar. It is shown above from
the disaggregated results that tests that have
similar data aggregated results can produce dif-
ferent disaggregated results (Fig. 3). Evans et al.
(1981) used the strategy of collective aggrega-
tion to compare groups of individuals at two
different sites and over time, concluding that
individuals did improve with time. Again, be-
cause this study has drawn conclusions about the
individual cognition of a group’s members from
collective aggregated  results, its  conclusions
may be misleading.
In summary, given that limitations in comput-
ing no longer apply and that cognitive mapping
studies collect individual response data, the
focus of the study should drive the type of ag-
gregation strategy employed. If the focus of the
study is on the overall cognition of a place,
collective aggregation  such as in Curtis and
Fotheringham (1995) is possibly the preferred
strategy. However, if the focus of the study is on
a group of individuals’ cognitive map knowl-
edge, the preferred type of analysis is that em-
ploying individual aggregation. n
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Perceptions of colors of individual map symbols are affected by simultaneous contrast, or induction, from surrounding
colors. In an experiment with human subjects, reaction times were significantly slower, with significantly more errors,
for test maps on which an induction model predicted that colors would be misinterpreted. Reaction times and error
rates improved significantly with map color adjustments that the model predicted would remove induced confusions.
These results represent progress toward establishing objective guidance for the design of effective color schemes in
computer-assisted mapping environments common in cartography, geographic information systems, and scientific
visualization. Key Words: cartography, color, simultaneous contrast, induction.
Introduction
Most visual displays produced using softwarefor mapping, geographic information sys-
tems, and scientific visualization are rendered in
color on CRTs. Researchers endeavor to choose
color schemes for these displays that are readily
understood. This effort is partly guided by choos-
ing colors with perceptual ordering that empha-
sizes the logical ordering of data categories
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